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CRIMINAL

LAW-GOVERNMENT CONDUCT THAT BREACHES A PLEA
AGREEMENT IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT

United States v. Hayes (1991)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a majority of criminal cases, defendants negotiate a plea of guilty
to one or more charges in exchange for some promise from the government.I A plea negotiation may consist of "charge bargaining" or "sentence bargaining."'2 Charge bargaining involves a defendant pleading
guilty to a charge lesser than the one originally brought by the government. 3 In sentence bargaining, the defendant's plea of guilty to the
original charge is made in exchange for the government's promise regarding the sentence to be imposed. 4 The government may promise to
seek leniency, probation, a specific sentence, or simply to "refrain from
making any recommendation to the judge."5
1. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JERALD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.1, at
554 (1984). When negotiating a plea agreement with the federal government,
the process is governed by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 11 (e) states in part:
The Attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with
a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the attorney, for the government will do any of the
following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that
such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the
court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of

the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 1 l(e)(l). For a comprehensive source of cases discussing plea
agreements, see Project, Twenty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure.- United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1990-1991, 80 Geo. L.J. 939, 1261-83
(1992). For an analysis of the process of plea bargaining under contractual theory and a discussion of the arguments for and against plea bargaining, see Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909
(1992).
2. 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, at 554-55.
3. 2 id. at 554. A defendant's incentive to plead guilty to a less serious
charge may be to receive a lower statutory maximum penalty for the offense or
to avoid the initial charge from appearing on his or her record of conviction. 2
id. at 554-55.
4. 2 id. at 555.

5. 2 id.

(1014)
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The United States Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York 6 recognized that plea negotiation was "an essential component of the administration of justice." '7 The Court emphasized that the government must
fulfill its promise to a defendant when that promise induces a defendant
to plead guilty.

8

The issue of whether the government breached its plea agreement
with a criminal defendant has been addressed by the Third Circuit on
several occasions. 9 Recently, the Third Circuit refined its notion of what

constitutes a governmental breach of a plea agreement in United States v.
Hayes.' 0 Using a previous Third Circuit decision, United States v. Mos-

cahlaidis, I as a guide to analyzing a plea agreement, the court in Hayes
reiterated the three different standards of review that govern the interpretation of a plea agreement. 12 First, the district court's factual findings are to be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.' 3 Second,
the appellate court has plenary review when the issue is whether the
government's conduct amounted to a breach. 14 Third, once a breach
has been shown, the case must be remanded to the district court for
either resentencing or withdrawal of the guilty plea.15
In Hayes, the issue on appeal addressed whether the government's
conduct at sentencing violated a plea agreement between the two par6. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
7. Id. at 260.
8. Id. at 262. The Court in Santobello found that the government had
breached its plea agreement because the government failed to keep its promise
concerning the sentence recommendation on the defendant's guilty plea. For a
discussion of the facts of Santobello, see infra note 56.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357 (3d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959
(1978); United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1976).
10. 946 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1991).
11. 868 F.2d 1357 (3d Cir. 1989). The Hayes court adopted the Moscahlaidis
decision's framework in analyzing plea agreements. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233.
12. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233 (quoting Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1360).
13. Id. (quoting Moscahlaidis,868 F.2d at 1360). The Third Circuit in Moscahlaidis stated that disputed facts that had been determined by the district court
were reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard by a reviewing court. Id.
(quoting Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1360).
14. Id. (quotingMoscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1360). The Hayes court quoted the
Moscahlaidis court's statement that " '[w]hether the government's conduct violates the terms of the plea agreement is a question of law and our review is
plenary.' " Id. (quoting Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1360); see also United States v.
Miller, 565 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978); United
States v. Crusco, 53 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1976).
15. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233 (quoting Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1360). The
Moscahlaidis court cited the United States Supreme Court's conclusion in
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), that remand is the remedy available in such a situation. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233 (quoting Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at
1360).
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ties. 16 The Third Circuit, therefore, had plenary review. 17 The Hayes
court discussed the specific language of the plea agreement and the alleged conduct of the government.1 8 While the court employed the same
comparison measures it had used in prior decisions, focusing on the language in the plea agreement and the government's conduct, the court
applied these measures to a new factual context. 1 9 The Hayes court distinguished its case from the only factually similar circuit decision, United
States v. Brummett, 20 a Sixth Circuit opinion, and held that the govern21
ment had breached the plea agreement.
II.
A.

CASE ANALYSIS

Facts and ProceduralHistory

In Hayes, the appellant, David S. Hayes, sought to appeal his criminal sentence contending that the government breached its plea agreement under which the government agreed not to recommend a specific
sentence.2 2 Hayes entered guilty pleas on December 3, 1990 to four
16. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233 n.2. The Hayes court stated in a footnote that the

factual findings were undisputed but that the issue on appeal was whether the
government's conduct violated the terms of the plea agreement. Id. The court,
therefore, evaluated whether the government had satisfied its commitment to
Hayes. Id. at 233.
17. See id. The court quoted the Moscahlaidis opinion for the proposition
that plenary review is the standard for determining whether government conduct violated the plea agreement. Id. (quoting Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1360).
18. See id. at 235.
19. Id. The Third Circuit noted that the factual situation in Hayes was different from the factual situations discussed in the court's previous cases. Id. For
a discussion of the cases reviewed by the court, see infra notes 64-103 and accompanying text.
20. 786 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1986).
21. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 235 n.5. For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Brummett, see infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
22. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 231. The Third Circuit stated Hayes' first challenge
as follows: "(1) in its Sentencing Memorandum, as well as in oral statements
during the sentencing, the government breached that portion of the plea agreement in which it agreed not to recommend a specific sentence[.]" Id. Hayes also
challenged the validity of his sentencing based on several other contentions.
Id. The court listed Hayes' remaining challenges as:
(2) the district court erred in its application of Sections 2G.1.1 and
2G. 1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines; (3) the failure of the district court
to consider [Hayes'] diminished capacity as a mitigating factor in determining the applicable Sentencing Guidelines was clearly erroneous;
(4) no factual basis existed in the record to support his guilty pleas to
Counts One and Two [involving the transportation of a minor in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution]; and (5) the forfeiture
of the property located in Fairview, Pennsylvania, was improper because [Hayes] did not own the property at the time the offenses
occurred.
Id. The Third Circuit did not address these issues because it remanded the case
after finding a breach of the plea agreement. Id.
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counts of an indictment charging him with illegal activity. 2 3 Hayes had
invited individuals, at least one of whom was a minor, to his Pennsylvania residence for parties that involved illicit drugs and prohibited
sexual activity. 24 Under Count One, Hayes was charged with conspiracy
to cause persons to travel in interstate commerce for purposes of criminally sanctioned sexual activity. 25 Only this count was subject to the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines). 2 6 Hayes'
guilty plea resulted in a sentence of fifty-four months of imprison23. Id. Hayes entered his pleas in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania to the following counts:
Count One charged [Hayes] with conspiracy to cause persons to travel
in interstate commerce for purposes of criminally sanctioned sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, Count Two with knowingly transporting an individual under the age of 18 in interstate commerce for
the purpose of prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423, Count
Three with knowingly and intentionally possessing with the intent to
distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(l), and Count Six with knowingly and intentionally distributing controlled substances at [Hayes'] residence, thereby subjecting the
real property to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(a).
Id.

24. Id. at 232. Beginning in 1985, Hayes gave parties during which he provided illicit drugs and encouraged his visitors, who came from Ohio and Pennsylvania, to engage in sexual acts with himself and others, sometimes in
exchange for money. Id.
25. Id. at 231. For a description of the counts to which Hayes pled guilty,
see supra note 23.
26. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 232 n. 1. The Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated pursuant to the powers of the United States Sentencing Commission. 28
U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (1988). The United States Sentencing Commission was established as an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United
States, whose members are appointed by the President and approved by the
Senate. Id. § 991(a). Following are the purposes of the United States
Commission:
(1) [To] establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal
criminal justice system that(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set
forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of
general sentencing procedures; and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process;
and
(2) [To] develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United
States Code.
Id. § 991(b).
The duties of the Commission in meeting its purposes involve promulgating
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ment 2 7 In its Sentencing Memorandum, the government advocated a
sentence for Count One within the range of the Sentencing Guidelines. 28 On appeal, Hayes objected to the government's sentencing rec29
ommendation as breaching the plea agreement.
Hayes also challenged his sentencing under the other counts.3 0
Although the Sentencing Guidelines did not apply to these counts,
Hayes was sentenced to an additional consecutive term of thirty-six
months and a concurrent term of twenty-four months. 3 ' These counts
had charged him with transporting a minor in interstate commerce for
prostitution and possession of narcotics with intent to distribute.3 2 On
and distributing to all courts of the United States and to the United States Probation System:
(1) guidelines, as described in this section, for use of a sentencing
court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case,
including(A) a determination whether to impose a sentence to probation, a fine, or a term of imprisonment;
(B) a determination as to the appropriate amount of a fine or
the appropriate length of a term of probation or a term of
imprisonment;
(2) general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or
any other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in the
view of the Commission would further the purposes set forth in section
3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code ....
Id. § 994(a). As mentioned in the provisions of title 28 of the United States
Code, the sentencing of defendants is determined according to guidelines that
have been promulgated in accordance with the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2). Id. § 991(b)(l)(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (1988). Title 18 sets forth
the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the following purposes:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or voca-

tional training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the
most effective manner[.]
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
The Third Circuit in Hayes noted that Count One, which involved a conspiracy spanning from 1985 to 1990, was the only count to which the Sentencing
Guidelines would apply. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 232 n.l.
27. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 231. Count One is relevant to Hayes' allegation that
the government breached its promise not to recommend a specific sentence. See
id. at 232.
28. See id. The Third Circuit in Hayes referred to the "Government's Response to Defendant's Presentence Objections and Sentencing Memorandum"
as the Government's Response. This case brief will refer to this document as the
government's Sentencing Memorandum. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 231.
31. Id.

32. Id. The 36-month term for Count Two was to run consecutively with
Count One, while the 24-month term for Count Three was to run concurrently
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appeal, Hayes objected to the government's conduct at sentencing,
which advocated a lengthy period of incarceration for these nonguide33
line counts.
The plea agreement at issue stated that the United States Attorney
agreed to "retain[] the right ...

to advise the sentencing Court of the

full nature and extent of the involvement of [Hayes] in the offenses
charged." '34 The United States Attorney further agreed to "make no
recommendation as to the specific sentence."'3 5 Thus, the government
allegedly breached this agreement when it included language in its Sentencing Memorandum which advocated "a sentence within the standard
range of the guidelines as to Count One . .. and a lengthy period of

'36
incarceration on the nonguidelines counts."
Furthermore, at the sentencing hearing, the United States Attorney
twice attempted to influence Hayes' sentencing. 3 7 The United States
Attorney stated in his opening remarks that the seriousness of Hayes'
offenses mandated lengthy incarceration. 3 8 He also advocated a lengthy
term of incarceration based on the seriousness of Hayes' multiple activi39
ties and their impact on the community.

with Counts One and Two. Id. Hayes was also ordered to forfeit his residence
and real property to the United States under Count Six. Id.
33. Id. at 232. The government thus based its sentencing recommendations on all of the counts to which Hayes pled guilty. See id.
34. Id. The full text of the relevant paragraph in the plea agreement to
which the United States Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania and
Hayes agreed states:
The United States Attorney retains the right of allocution at the time of
sentencing to advise the sentencing Court of the full nature and extent
of the involvement of [Hayes] in the offenses charged in the Indictment
and of any other matters relevant to the imposition of a fair and just
sentence.
Id.
35. Id. The plea agreement read: "The United States Attorney will make
no recommendation as to the specific sentence that the Court should impose,
but will provide the United States Probation Office and the District Court with
any and all information pertaining to sentencing, including but not limited to all
relevant conduct." Id.
36. Id. The full paragraph of the Sentencing Memorandum stated:
[T]he government advocates a sentence within the standard range of
the guidelines as to Count One (a range of 57 to 60 months incarceration) and a lengthy period of incarceration on the nonguidelines
counts, along with whatever, psychological and/or psychiatric treatment the Court deems appropriate while [Hayes] undergoes that
incarceration.
Id.
37. Id.

38. Id. The United States Attorney's opening comments emphasized to the
district court that it was in the government's opinion that such a serious offense
mandated lengthy incarceration. Id.
39. Id. at 232-33. The United States Attorney's conclusion stated the many
factors that supported a lengthy incarceration for Hayes. Id. These factors included the seriousness of the offense, its occurrence over five years, its impact
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Analysis by the Third Circuit

The Hayes court began its analysis of the alleged breach of the plea
agreement by referring to a prior Third Circuit opinion, United States v.
Moscahlaidis.40 The Third Circuit in Moscahlaidisreiterated the three factors that determine the scope of appellate review. 41 First, factual deter42
minations are reviewed according to a clearly erroneous standard.
Second, the court has plenary review of questions of law, such as
whether government conduct amounted to a violation. 4 3 Finally, as
mandated by the United States Supreme Court, if an appellant proves
that the government breached a plea agreement, the case must be remanded for either resentencing or withdrawal of the appellant's guilty
plea.

44

1. Principles of Contract Law Applied to Plea Agreements
The Third Circuit in Hayes first asserted that the government must
abide by the plea agreement. 4 5 The court noted that the factual determinations of the terms of the plea agreement at issue and the government's conduct were undisputed. 46 The court focused its inquiry on
whether the government's conduct violated the terms of the agreeon the community, and the fact that there was no evidence indicating that Hayes
had been rehabilitated. Id.
40. 868 F.2d 1357 (3d Cir. 1989). The Third Circuit in Hayes reaffirmed the
framework for analyzing plea agreements that it developed in Moscahlaidis.
Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233.
41. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1360.
42. Id. (citing United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1983)). The
Third Circuit in Moscahlaidis stated that the clearly erroneous standard limits its
review of the disputed facts as determined by a district court. Id.
43. Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978) and United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21 (3d Cir.
1977)).
44. Id. (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)). In Santobello,
the Supreme Court found that although a plea agreement had been breached by
the government inadvertently, this circumstance did not lessen the impact of the
breach. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. In discussing the relief available to the petitioner, whose case originated in the New York state court system, the Supreme
Court stated that "the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the
duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of
pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the case to the state courts for
further consideration." Id. at 262-63. The Court concluded that it was within
the state court's discretion to determine what relief would be granted to the
petitioner. Id. at 263. The Court believed that the state court was better
equipped to evaluate the circumstances of the case. Id. The state court was in a
better position to choose between granting specific performance of the plea
agreement, which in this case required resentencing by a different judge, or allowing the petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea. Id.
45. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233 (citing Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1361). The
Third Circuit emphasized that the government must honor its bargain with
Hayes. Id.
46. Id. at 233 n.2.
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ment.4 7 The court also stated that to determine whether the government honored its commitment to Hayes at sentencing, principles of
contract law control.

48

Relying on the United States Supreme Court's seminal holding in
Santobello v. New York, 4 9 the Hayes court stated that the government must
fulfill its promise that served as part of the inducement or consideration
for the plea agreement. 50 The Supreme Court in Santobello explained
that a promise serves as an inducement or consideration when the defendant's agreement to enter the plea rests on the government's promise to a "significant degree."' 51 The government's duty to fulfill
promises made during plea negotiations is so essential that even an inadvertent breach is not a defense. 5 2 The Hayes court emphasized that a
promise made by the government will receive close scrutiny. 53 The
Hayes court stated that it should utilize such a high standard because a
defendant risks the "surrender of certain constitutional rights including
54
a meaningful restriction of his liberty" in the plea bargaining process.
Furthermore, the government may not assert harmless error because
55
"due process and equity require that the sentence be vacated."
2.

Government Promises in Plea Agreements

The Hayes court also reiterated the core holding by the Supreme
Court in Santobello that "a prosecutor must keep a promise made in a
plea agreement."156 The Hayes court pointed out that subsequent to the
47. Id.
48. Id. at 233 & n.3. Previously, in Moscahlaidis,the Third Circuit had stated

that "[a]lthough a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it remains contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under contract-law standards." Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1361.

49. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
50. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233 (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262). The Supreme
Court in Santobello stated that "when a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello, 404
U.S. at 262. The Court stressed the need for this constant factor to serve as a
procedural safeguard for a defendant during the Court's evaluation of a guilty
plea. Id.
51. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. The Court emphasized the agreement's

dependence on the government's promise as an indication that the promise was
an inducement. Id.
52. Id. at 262-63.
53. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233.
54. Id. The Supreme Court in Santobello explained that a guilty plea is a
serious occurrence because it results in a waiver of one's fundamental rights to a
trial by jury, to confront an accuser, to call defense witnesses, to remain silent,
and, finally, to be judged by a standard of proof of beyond all reasonable doubt.
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring).
55. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63.
56. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233-34. In Santobello, facing two felony gambling
counts, the defendant had entered into a plea agreement with one prosecutor,
pleading to a lesser-included gambling offense in exchange for the prosecutor's
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Supreme Court's decision in Santobello, the Third Circuit had previously
addressed the issue of governmental promises in plea agreements in
several contexts. 5 7 The Hayes court discussed three of these decisions,
United States v. Crusco,5" United States v. Miller 59 and United States v. Moscahlaidis,60 as illustrations of the Third Circuit's analysis of alleged plea
agreement violations. The Hayes court then distinguished the factually
similar case, United States v. Brummett. 6 1 Next, the Hayes court analogized
its case to Miller and Santobello.62 Finally, the court discussed the appli63
cable remedy.
a.

United States v. Crusco

In Crusco, the defendant, Phillip Cimmino, agreed to enter a guilty
plea in exchange for a maximum sentence of seven years, and a promise
by the government "not to take a position on sentencing."'64 The alpromise to make no sentencing recommendation. Santobelto, 404 U.S. at 258.
Following several delays, the sentencing hearing finally took place before a different judge and with a new prosecutor replacing the prosecutor who had negotiated the plea. Id. at 258-59. The new prosecutor, apparently ignorant of the
preceding commitment, recommended the maximum one-year sentence, citing
the defendant's criminal record and alleged links with organized crime. Id. at
259. Dismissing the defense counsel's request for an adjournment in order to
prepare proof of the first prosecutor's promise, the sentencing judge referred to
the defendant's presentence report, stating that the prosecutor's recommendation "doesn't make a particle of difference." Id. The defendant's long and serious criminal record mandated institutionalization as the only way to stop his
anti-social behavior. Id. at 260. The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting
that the lapse in orderly prosecutorial procedures that occurred was inexcusable, despite the prosecutors' heavy workload. Id. The Court stressed that plea
bargaining is an essential component of the justice system and should be encouraged when done properly. Id. The Court further emphasized that the defendant had "bargained" for a lesser charge, but on the condition that no
sentence be recommended by the prosecutor. Id. at 262. Because the prosecutor conceded that the promise to refrain from a recommendation had been
made, the Court stated that the prosecution was not in a position to argue that
its inadvertent breach of the plea agreement was immaterial. Id. The Court concluded that the inadvertence of the breach did not lessen its impact on the defendant. Id.
57. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233-34.
58. 536 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1976). For a discussion of Crusco, see infra notes
64-78 and accompanying text.
59. 565 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978). For a
discussion of Miller, see infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
60. 868 F.2d 1357 (3d Cir. 1989). For a discussion of Moscahlaidis, see infra
notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
61. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 235 n.5 (discussing United States v. Brummett, 786
F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1986)).
62. Id. at 235. For a discussion of the reasoning in Hayes, see infra notes
118-33 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 236. For a discussion of the remedy given to the defendant in
Hayes, see infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
64. United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 23 (3d Cir. 1976). Cimmino initially pled not guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with
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leged government misconduct was an attack on Cimmino's character
made at the sentencing hearing. 6 5 Cimmino's attorney had pleaded for
leniency, referring to the needs of Cimmino's family and the belief that
"by no stretch of the imagination is [Cimmino] a heavy weight or person
in a position to deal in large quantities of drugs, although that seems to
be the allegation by the members of the . . .United States Attorney's

office." '66 The government responded by noting that Cimmino had sold
a half-kilogram of almost pure heroin as a sample to an undercover
agent. 6 7 The government stated that this demonstrated Cimmino's im68
portant ties to organized crime and his danger to the community.
The government asserted three separate grounds to justify the language used at sentencing. 69 The Third Circuit, in Crusco, rejected each
intent to distribute certain controlled substances, and a second count of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of heroin. Id Following several
years of pre-trial proceedings, he ultimately pled guilty to the second count in
exchange for a maximum sentence of seven years and the prosecution's promise
to "take no position on sentencing." Id. Cimmino was sentenced to six years'
imprisonment and an additional three years' special parole. Id. Upon sentencing, he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that he had been misled as to
the maximum possible sentence and that the government had breached its
promise not to recommend a sentence. Id. His request was denied and he appealed to the Third Circuit. Id.
The Third Circuit addressed Cimmino's argument that he had misunderstood the plea agreement. Id. at 24. Cimmino believed that the maximum sentence he could receive was seven years, meaning a maximum time of
confinement of four years and three years of special parole. Id. The government argued that the maximum sentence was seven years of confinement plus
three years of special parole. Id. Considering that the government and the district judge had not made the distinction between sentence and confinement, the
Third Circuit held that Cimmino's misunderstanding was reasonable. Id. The
Third Circuit further held that as a result of this misunderstanding, Cimmino
had not entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 24-25; see also Mosher
v. Lavallee, 491 F.2d 1346, 1348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974). In
addition, the existing Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure required that defendants be informed of the "consequences of the plea" for the
plea to be valid. Crusco, 536 F.2d at 25; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. The Third
Circuit concluded that Cimmino had not been "unambiguously informed of the
maximum punishment he faced." Crusco, 536 F.2d at 25; see also United States v.
Hawthorne, 532 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80
(5th Cir. 1975); Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1969). The Third
Circuit, therefore, permitted Cimmino to withdraw his guilty plea and to plead
again. Crusco, 536 F.2d at 25.
65. Crusco, 536 F.2d at 25. Cimmino's objection to the government conduct
was his second argument on appeal. Id. For a discussion of his first argument
regarding his misunderstanding of his maximum possible sentence, see supra
note 64.
66. Crusco, 536 F.2d at 25.
67. Id. The government made this statement after having promised to refrain from taking a position on sentencing. Id.
68. Id. The government sought to show Cimmino's danger to the community by explaining that he had been arrested and indicted on another conspiracy
count while out on bail in the present case. Id.
69. Id. The government argued its right to rebut defense counsel's factual
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of these arguments. 70 First, the Crusco court rejected the argument that
the government was simply fulfilling its obligation to rebut defense
counsel's factual misrepresentations. 7 1 The court interpreted defense
counsel's statement as nothing more than "a paradigmatic argument for
72
leniency in sentence."1
Second, the Crusco court dismissed the argument that the government's brief remarks regarding Cimmino's character should be excused
because the judge made the actual sentencing decision. 73 In dismissing
the government's second argument, the Third Circuit, in Crusco, relied
on the Supreme Court's ruling in Santobello that a prosecutor's promise
had to be fulfilled regardless of whether a breach of that promise constituted harmless error.74 Thus, the government violated its promise not
to recommend a sentence by portraying Cimmino as a major figure in
organized crime and a danger to the community. 7 5 The Crusco court
stated that the government's characterization of Cimmino was "a trans'76
parent effort to influence the severity of [his] sentence."
Finally, the Crusco court refuted the government's contention that
its agreement with Cimmino required the government to abstain from
recommending the terms of Cimmino's sentence. 7 7 The court concluded that this argument required too strict and narrow an interpretamisrepresentations, the lack of effect of the government's remarks on the sentencingjudge and the narrow construction of the promise not to recommend a
specific sentence. Id.
70. Id. at 25-26.
71. Id. The government was referring to defense counsel's portrayal of
Cimmino as a family man, with integrity and honor, who was not a heavyweight
drug dealer as the government had depicted him. Id. at 25.
72. Id. The Third Circuit noted that if defense counsel was embellishing
the facts, the government had foreclosed any response by its unqualified promise not to take a position on sentencing. Id. at 25-26. In addition, the Third
Circuit noted that the district court had access to all of the information in the
case and was able to form its own opinion concerning Cimmino's character,
without the assistance of the government. Id. at 26.
73. Id. The Crusco court labelled the government's statement that it was
fulfilling its part of the plea agreement and leaving the sentencing to the judge
as "self-serving." Id. The government's remarks at sentencing were not justified even if such remarks did not affect the sentencing judge. Id.
74. Id. (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). The
Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Santobello had not been "swayed
by the district judge's assurance that he was not influenced in his sentencing by
the prosecutor's recommendation." Id. (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262).
75. Id. The Third Circuit stated that although the facts in Santobello were
more blatant, the government in Crusco had promised to take no position on
sentencing, and yet the government portrayed Cimmino in such a negative manner that it in effect took a position and tried to influence his sentencing. Id.
76. Id.The court explained its view that "[o]nly a stubbornly literal mind"
would fail to interpret the government's language as taking a position on sentencing. Id.

77. Id.
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78
tion of the plea agreement between the parties.

b.

United States v. Miller

79
The Hayes court also discussed its decision in United States v. Miller.
In Miller, the defendant, Ronald Miller, entered a guilty plea in exchange
for the government's promise not to make a recommendation at sentencing. 80 The government, however, retained the right to inform the
district court about Miller's cooperation. 8 '
Miller alleged that the government violated the plea agreement in
82
responding to defense counsel's request for leniency in sentencing.
Miller contended that the police had induced him to commit illegal ac-

tivity. 83 The defendant also contended that he had cooperated with law

enforcement officials. 84 The government responded to Miller's contentions that a year and a half had elapsed between the alleged inducement
and the commission of the crime, and that Miller had not cooperated at
85
all.
Miller asserted that these remarks violated the government's promise not to recommend a sentence. 8 6 In his assertion, Miller relied on the
Third Circuit's earlier holding in Crusco.8 7 In response to Miller's assertion, the Miller court reaffirmed the holding in Crusco that the government must adhere strictly to the terms of its bargain. 88 The Miller court,
78. Id. The court rejected the government's justification for a strict interpretation of the plea agreement as untenable. Id. The court stressed:
An unqualified promise of the prosecution not to take a position on
sentencing obviously jeopardizes the Government's position in the sentencing process and may require the Government to remain silent when
it should stand up and speak. The Government, therefore, must also
clearly understand the scope and depth of its commitment and the need
for precision in plea bargaining. It may reach port in the plea bargaining process but founder there because of careless or loose language in
its commitment. Once it makes a promise, Santobello requires strict
adherence.
Id.
79. 565 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978). In
Miller, the defendant, Ronald Miller, was charged in a two count indictment involving unlawful possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Id. at 1273.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1274.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The government responded to defendant's attempted "excuse defense" by questioning: "How does it make it excusable? Did he hold a gun to
his head for a year and a half? How does that make it excusable?" Id. at 1274 &
n. 1. The government also argued that to call Miller's actions "cooperation" was
a travesty. Id. at 1274 n.2.
86. Id. at 1274.
87. Id. Miller also cited the Supreme Court's holding in Santobello as controlling. Id.
88. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/17

12

Khoriaty: Criminal Law - Government Conduct That Breaches a Plea Agreement

1026

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. 1014

however, distinguished the language of the plea agreement in the case
before it from that used in Crusco. 8 9
In the plea agreement at issue in Crusco, the government promised
"not to take a position;" in the Miller case, on the other hand, the government promised "not to make a recommendation." 90 Thus, the government's promise in Crusco not to take a position was a "broad,
unqualified promise" that deprived the government of the right to comment on the seriousness of the sentence or on whether the defendant
should be imprisoned. 9 1 The agreement in Miller not to make a recommendation coupled with a reserved right to comment on cooperation
92
was a narrower promise.
In Miller, the government labelled Miller's lack of cooperation a
travesty, which the Third Circuit characterized as a fair rebuttal comment regarding the defendant's actions. 9 3 The court stated that the
government's remarks that Miller's actions were inexcusable did not violate the plea agreement. 9 4 The court concluded that this statement was
beyond the scope of the government's promise not to make a recommendation regarding the sentence. 95 The court, however, admonished
the government that plea bargaining may involve inherent semantic pitfalls. 9 6 This warning reiterated the Third Circuit's statement in Crusco
that a plea bargain may falter due to careless or loose language in the
89. Id. at 1274. The Third Circuit also stated that Miller was distinguishable from Santobello. Id.
90. Id. at 1275. In Crusco, the government attempted to equate its promise
"not to take a position" with "not making a recommendation," but this argument was rejected by the Third Circuit. United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21,
25-26 (3d Cir. 1976). In Miller, the Third Circuit recognized that the government "ha[d] only promised to make no recommendation as to sentence and
ha[d] expressly reserved the right to comment on defendant's cooperation."
Miller, 565 F.2d at 1275.
91. Miller, 565 F.2d at 1275.
92. Id. The Miller court compared the two promises in Crusco and the case
at bar: "The difference between the two terms is elementary, for the promise
not to recommend is narrow, speaking only as to the sentence to be imposed,
whereas a promise to take no position speaks to no attempt at all to influence the
defendant's sentence." Id.

93. Id. The Third Circuit held that such remarks did not violate the government's promise because the government had expressly reserved the right to
comment on Miller's cooperation. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The Miller court appeared concerned with the prosecutor's remarks

about the alleged coercion of Miller because such remarks did not fall within the
right to comment on Miller's cooperation. Id. Nevertheless, the court accepted
the remarks as a rhetorical response to Miller's attempted excuse defense, which

the court held was not prohibited by the government's narrow promise "not to
make a recommendation." Id.
96. Id. The court reminded the government that once promises were
made, they had to be fulfilled in the interest ofjustice and fairness to the accused

and to the public. Id.
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government's commitment. 9 7 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in
Santobello held that even an inadvertent breach of a plea agreement required a remand of the case, because this remand would appropriately
recognize the duties of the prosecution in relation to the promises made
9
in plea bargaining. 8
c.

United States v. Moscahlaidis

The Third Circuit in Hayes also discussed United States v. Moscahlaidis.99 In Moscahlaidis, the government promised in the plea agreement "not [to] take a position relative to whether or not a custodial
sentence shall be imposed" while reserving the right to inform the sen00
tencing judge of the activities of the defendant, John Moscahlaidis.1
Notwithstanding its agreement, the government described Moscahlaidis
negatively and portrayed him as a greedy and immoral criminal.' 0 ' The
Third Circuit held that based on its conduct, the government violated
the plea agreement. 10 2 In support of its holding, the Moscahlaidis court
stated that the language in the agreement that the government would
10 3
take no position at sentencing required strict adherence.
d.

United States v. Brummett Distinguished

Having stated that Hayes was factually distinguishable from previous
decisions, 10 4 the Third Circuit also distinguished Hayes from a factually
similar Sixth Circuit decision, United States v. Brummett.10 5 In Brummett,
97. Crusco, 536 F.2d at 26. The Crusco court emphasized the importance of
precision in plea bargaining as well as the need for the government to understand the scope and depth of its commitment. Id.
98. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
99. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 234 (citing United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d
1357 (3d Cir. 1989)).
100. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1358-59.
101. Id. at 1359.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1363.
104. United States v. Hayes, 946 F.2d 230, 235 (3d Cir. 1991).
105. 786 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1986). The Third Circuit in Hayes mentioned
that there were no cases that ever before addressed its issue and in the same
particular context. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 235 n.5. The Hayes court noted, however,
that the Brummett case was the most similar to the facts of Hayes. Id. In Brummett,
the defendant Eddie Wayne Brummett, a dispatcher for a fire department, was
charged with aiding and abetting his co-defendants in a beating and sexual assault. Brummett, 786 F.2d at 721. Brummett pled guilty to the charges in exchange for promises made by the government in a plea agreement. Id. at 722.
For a list of the government's promises, see infra note 106.
Brummett sought to reduce his sentence arguing that his due process rights
were violated and that the government breached the plea agreement. Brummett,
786 F.2d at 721-22. The alleged due process violation occurred because the
district court appeared to hold Brummett to the duty of trust of a police officer
although he was simply an off-duty dispatcher. Id. The Sixth Circuit rejected
Brummett's claim and ruled that the district court had simply held Brummett to
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the government promised, inter alia, to refrain from recommending "a
specific period of incarceration or a specific fine" for the defendant Eddie Wayne Brummett's offenses during sentencing. 10 6 In exchange for
these promises, Brummett promised to enter a guilty plea and to cooperate with the government.' 0 7 The government retained the right to
inform the court of the seriousness of Brummett's offenses and of the
08
necessity to incarcerate Brummett for some period for each offense.'
In appealing the sentencing decision, Brummett alleged that the
government violated its plea agreement by responding to the court's
question regarding sentence recommendations. 10 9 The government described defense counsel's request for a six month prison term as too
lenient and submitted to the court that a lengthy period of incarceration
would act as a more appropriate deterrent.' 1s The government stated,
however, that it would abide by its plea agrement not to make a specific
sentencing recommendation." '
The Sixth Circuit concluded in Brummett that the government had
not breached its agreement, although the government's recommendation for a " 'lengthy' " period of incarceration clouded " 'an otherwise
clear picture.'

"112

The court emphasized that Brummett had received

a standard of trust imposed upon him by virtue of his position at the police
department. Id. at 722. The district court interpreted Brummett's possession of

the keys to the jail, his presence at the jail and his operation of the jail radio as
indications that he had been acting in an official capacity when he committed the
offense. Id. at 721.
106. Brummett, 786 F.2d at 722. The government in Brummett had made
four promises in return for the defendant's plea of guilty and promise to cooperate. Id. In addition to the promise not to recommend a specific sentence or fine,
the government promised: "(1) to dismiss other charges; (2) to recommend

concurrent sentences; (3) to recommend that if Brummett were sentenced to a
prison term exceeding one year, that the court specify he may be paroled under

18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2)." Id. Brummett alleged that the government breached
the agreement by breaking the promise not to recommend a specific sentence or
fine. Id. The government had, however, retained the right to inform the court
that some period of incarceration was appropriate. Id.
The Third Circuit in Hayes focused on the government's retention of the

right to comment on some period of incarceration in Brummett to distinguish the
two cases. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 235 n.5. The government in Hayes did not retain a
similar right. Id.
107. Brummett, 786 F.2d at 722.
108. Id.

109. Id.
110. Id. at 722-23. Brummett's defense counsel had argued that Brummett
should receive a six month term of imprisonment, with the remaining time being
served on probation. Id. at 722. The government allegedly breached the plea
agreement by advocating a "lengthy period of incarceration" rather than simply
recommending "some period of incarceration." Id. at 723.

111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting United States v. Bulloch, 725 F.2d 118, 119 (D.C. Cir.
1984)). The Sixth Circuit stated that although plea agreements are to be construed strictly, the plea agreement had not been breached in Brummett's case.
Id.
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the " 'benefit of his bargain,' "113 yet the court admonished the governabout the government's
ment to avoid conduct that may raise questions
4
adherence to the terms of a plea bargain."1
In Hayes, the Third Circuit distinguished its case from the Sixth Circuit's holding in Brummett by referring to a clause in the Brummett plea
agreement that permitted the government to comment to the court that
some period of incarceration would be appropriate. 11 5 No such clause
existed in the Hayes plea agreement. 1 6 Furthermore, the Hayes court
stated that defense counsel in Brummett had anticipated some period of
incarceration because counsel had advocated a sentence of six months,
whereas defense counsel in Hayes had sought probation as an alternative
17
to imprisonment.
3.

The Reasoning in Hayes

After dismissing the Brummett decision, the Third Circuit categorized Hayes as falling between Miller and Santobello. 118 The Third Circuit
interpreted the language of Hayes' plea agreement requiring that the
government "make no recommendation as to the specific sentence" differently from how such language was interpreted in both Miller and
Santobello. 119 The Third Circuit in Miller held that the government's
statements were consistent with the plea agreement, while the Supreme
Court in Santobello held that the prosecutor's statement violated the plea
0
agreement.12
In Hayes, the government promised "to make no recommendation
as to the specific sentence" but then expressly advocated in its Sentencing Memorandum a sentence within the range of the Sentencing Guidelines for Count One.' 2 ' The Third Circuit held that the identification
by the government of a specific range of sentence instead of other alterof
natives such as probation or a fine, clashed with the plain language
22
the plea agreement and with Hayes' request for probation. 1
113. Id. (quoting Bercheny v. Johnson, 633 F.2d 473, 476 (6th Cir. 1980)).
114. Id. (citing Bulloch, 725 F.2d at 119).
115. United States v. Hayes, 946 F.2d 230, 235 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991). For a
description of the clause in the plea agreement in Brummett, see supra text accompanying note 108.
116. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 235' n.5.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 235.
119. Id.
120. Id. The Third Circuit in Hayes stated that in Miller, the government's

"mere rebuttal of defense counsel's exculpatory statements was found not to
offend the 'make no recommendation' provision." Id. The Hayes court also
stated that in Santobello, "the prosecutor's explicit endorsement of imposing the
maximum term did violate the 'make no recommendation' commitment." Id.
121. Id. Count One was the only count subject to the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 232 n.1. For a description of the purposes behind the promulgation
of the Sentencing Guidelines, see supra note 26.
122. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 235. The Hayes court stated that the government
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To reach its decision, the Third Circuit measured the prejudice
caused by the government's recommendations by examining the lower
range of sentences potentially available to the defendant under Count
One.123 Hayes argued that he was eligible for a "downward departure"
from the range set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines due to diminished
capacity.' 24 This departure would have qualified him for probation as
25
an alternative to imprisonment.'
The government argued that its recommendation constituted harmless error. 126 Because the Sentencing Guidelines restricted the judge's
discretion, the government's recommendation did not influence the
judge's sentencing decision.1 2 7 This assertion was based on the premise
that in seeking a sentence within the range of the Sentencing Guidelines,
the government was not recommending a specific sentence because the
judge could not depart from the range and order probation for Hayes
without a valid reason for the downward departure. 1 28 The Third Circuit held that this argument had no merit because the defendant already
had shown evidence of a colorable claim for a downward departure. 129
The Hayes court also reiterated the Supreme Court's holding in
Santobello that the absence of influence on the sentencingjudge was irrelhad specifically identified a period of 57 to 60 months of incarceration, while
excluding the options for a shorter period of imprisonment, probation, or a fine.
Id.

123. Id. (stating that prejudice caused to defendant became "even more
striking" when alternative ranges of sentences were examined).
124. Id. Hayes had actively sought a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines range predicated on a diminished capacity defense. Id. He had calculated
his offense level to be four or six, placing him within a Sentencing Guidelines
range of zero to six months. Id. at 235 n.6. Hayes' attorney argued at the sentencing hearing that the purported mitigating factors of a diminished capacity
ought to be considered in granting Hayes' request for probation. Id. at 235.
According to the Sentencing Guidelines, a "downward departure" from the
prescribed range for an offense level and offender category is available when
"the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing

Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (rev. ed. 1988), ch. 1, pt.

A(4)(b) (policy statement).

125. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 235 & n.6. The district court, however, sentenced
Hayes to a term of 54 months on Count One alone. Id. at 235. Although the
district court did not accept Hayes' recommendation, it did reduce the guideline
range suggested by the government from 57-60 months to a range of 51-60
months. Id. at 235-36. This was largely due to the fact that the probation officer
had responded to Hayes' objections to his Presentence Report by admitting that
a mistake had been made in calculating Hayes' total offense level. Id.
126. Id. at 236.
127. Id.
128. Id. For a discussion of the concept of a "downward departure," see
supra note 124.
129. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 236. Hayes had presented expert opinion evidence
in seeking a downward departure due to diminished capacity. Id. at 235.
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promise. 13

The Hayes court dismissed the government's argument that attempted to narrow the interpretation of the plea agreement. 131 The
court declined to interpret the government's promise to "make no recommendation as to the specific sentence" as "an agreement not to rec32
ommend a specific term of incarceration within the guideline range."1
The Hayes court concluded that the government's recommendation of
the range of 57 to 60 months of imprisonment clashed with the terms of
13 3
the plea agreement.
4.

Hayes' Remedy

In holding that the government had breached its promise not to
make a recommendation at sentencing, the Hayes court discussed the
remedy available to Hayes. 134 The court concluded that because the
government had violated the plea agreement, Hayes' sentence must be
vacated and the case remanded. 135 The Hayes court, relying on Moscahlaidis, directed the district court, on remand, to determine if the appropriate remedy would entail specific performance of the plea
agreement or withdrawal of the plea. 136 Essentially, the district court
was asked to exercise its discretion to determine the appropriate choice
between enforcing specific performance through resentencing and with13 7
drawing the guilty plea.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Third Circuit analyzed Hayes consistently with prior decisions
that analyzed the different aspects of a plea agreement. In holding that
the government had violated its plea agreement, the Third Circuit in
Hayes established a novel definition of government misconduct. Both
prosecutors and defense counsel must be aware that language promising
130. Id. at 236. The Supreme Court in Santobello found that a sentencing
judge's claim that a prosecutor's comments did not influence him was irrelevant
in determining the government's adherence to a plea agreement. Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). For a discussion of Santobello v. New
York, see supra notes 44, 49-52 and accompanying text.
131. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 236.
132. Id. (stating that "[i]f such a limited occasion were intended, it should
have been clearly stated in the agreement").
133. Id. at 235.
134. Id. at 236.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1357 (3d Cir.
1989) (citation omitted) and United States v. American Bag & Paper Corp., 609

F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1979)).
137. Id. The Supreme Court addressed this proposition in Santobello. See
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971). For a discussion of Santobello,

see supra notes 44, 49-52 and accompanying text.
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"not to make a recommendation" is interpreted more narrowly than language promising "not to take a position."'138
The government's promise in the plea agreement "not to make a
recommendation as to the specific sentence" prevents the government
from advocating a specific range of incarceration, to the exclusion of a
shorter term of incarceration or alternative means of punishment.' 3 9
The promise "not to make a recommendation" may, however, permit
indirect or rebuttal comments that may affect sentencing. 140 In distinguishing Hayes from the Sixth Circuit's decision in Brummett, the Third

Circuit illustrated the trend toward construing plea agreements narrowly. The Third Circuit distinguished the two cases solely on the basis
of a clause in Brummett's plea agreement that permitted the government to comment to the court that some period of incarceration was
appropriate. 14'

In contrast, the Hayes court reiterated that a promise by the government "not to take a position" is a broad, unqualified promise not to
comment on sentencing, either directly or indirectly. 142 Thus, after
Hayes, even if the government in a plea agreement retains the right to
comment on the defendant's activities to the court, the scope of these
comments is strictly limited.143
Finally, Hayes dictates that if a reviewing court finds that the government has breached a plea agreement, that court must remand the case to
the lower court for a determination of the defendant's available relief.' 44 The defendant will either be resentenced before a different
judge, or the guilty plea will be withdrawn. 145
DanielleJ. Khoriaty

138. See Hayes, 946 F.2d at 234. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's differing interpretations of governmental promises in the plea agreements in Crusco
and Miller, see supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
139. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 235.
140. Id. For a discussion of the Miller court's interpretation of the government promise "to make no recommendation" as to the sentence, see supra notes
89-92 and accompanying text.
141. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 235 n.5. For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's
opinion in Brummett, see supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
142. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 234; see also Miller, 565 F.2d at 1275; Crusco, 536
F.2d at 26.
143. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 234. For a discussion of this proposition in the
Third Circuit's Miller opinion, see supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
144. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 236. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's holding in Santobello in which the Court addressed this point, see supra note 44.
145. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 236; Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263
(1971).
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